

A Probabilistic Baby-step Giant-step Algorithm

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Abstract: In this paper, a new algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm problem is presented which is similar to the usual baby-step giant-step algorithm. Our algorithm exploits the order of the discrete logarithm in the multiplicative group of a finite field. Using randomization with parallelized collision search, our algorithm indicates some weakness in NIST curves over prime fields which are considered to be the most conservative and safest curves among all NIST curves.

1 INTRODUCTION

It is well-known that computationally hard number theoretic problems are used as primitives in public-key cryptography. On that basis, public-key cryptography can be divided into two categories. One uses the hardness of factorizing large integer as the building blocks to construct public-key protocols and the other is based on the computational difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem. In this paper, we are interested in the latter.

Let G be a cyclic group of prime order p and generated by P which is written additive. Given an element $Q = xP \in G$, the *discrete logarithm problem (DLP)* in G is to compute the integer x . This integer x is called the discrete logarithm of Q with the base P . There are generic algorithms such as the baby-step giant-step algorithm (Hoffstein et al., 2008) which solves DLP in any group G .

In this paper, we develop and study a different version of the baby-step giant-step algorithm. The novelty of our approach comes from the *implicit representation* using F_p^\times as *auxiliary group*. Our approach leads to a way to reduce the discrete logarithm problem to a problem in F_p^\times . The advantage of this approach is, F_p^\times has many subgroups and one can exploit the rich and well understood subgroup structure of F_p^\times . The use of F_p^\times as an auxiliary group was studied earlier, see (Cheon, 2006; Brown and Gallant, 2004). However we use it in a different context.

In Theorem 1 we develop an algorithm that solves

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the discrete logarithm problem using implicit representation. Two things come out of this theorem:

- A** If the secret key x belongs to some small subgroup of F_p^\times , there can be an efficient attack on the DLP.
- B** If somehow it is known to an attacker that the secret key is in some subgroup H of F_p^\times , that information can be used to develop a better attack.

The question remains, what happens if no information about the secret x is known. We develop a probabilistic algorithm (Theorem 2) to expand our attack. To understand this probabilistic attack properly, we study it on the curve P-256. This is an NIST recommended curve over a prime field and is considered secure. Our study, which we present in details in Section 3 indicates some weakness in this curve.

2 MAIN WORK

Let G be a cyclic group of prime order p and generated by P which is written additive. For $y \in F_p$, $yP \in G$ is called the *implicit representation* of $y \in F_p$ (with respect to G and P). The following lemma comes from the idea of implicit representation of a finite field, proposed by Maurer and Wolf (Maurer and Wolf, 1999).

Lemma 1. *Let a, b be any two integers. Then $a = b \pmod{p}$ if and only if $aP = bP$ in G .*

Proof. Assume that $a = b \pmod{p}$, then $a = tp + b$ for some integer t . Then $aP = tpP + bP = bP$. Conversely, assume that $aP = bP$, then $(a - b)P = 0$ in

G and this means $p|(a - b)$ which implies that $a = b \pmod{p}$. \square

The usefulness of this lemma is to be able to decide on the equality in \mathbb{F}_p^\times by looking at the equality in G . The following algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm problem uses the order of the discrete logarithm in the multiplicative group of a finite field. This algorithm is also deterministic but this is different from the baby-step giant-step (Hoffstein et al., 2008) as it uses the implicit representation with multiplicative group of a finite field as auxiliary group.

Theorem 1. *Let G be an additive cyclic group generated by P and order of P is a prime p . Let $Q = xP$ be another given element of G (x is unknown). For a given divisor d of $p - 1$, let H be the unique subgroup of \mathbb{F}_p^\times of order d . Then, one can decide whether or not x belongs to H in $O(\sqrt{d})$ steps. Furthermore, if x belongs to H , the same algorithm will also find the discrete logarithm x in $O(\sqrt{d})$ steps where each step is an exponentiation in the group G .*

Proof. Since H is a subgroup of the cyclic group \mathbb{F}_p^\times , we assume that it is generated by some element ζ . If the generator of H is not given to us, we can compute it using a generator of \mathbb{F}^\times and d . The proof of whether x belongs to H or not follows from the well-known baby-step giant-step algorithm (Hoffstein et al., 2008, Proposition 2.22) to compute the discrete logarithm.

Let n be the smallest integer greater than \sqrt{d} . Then $x \in H$ if and only if there exists an integer k with $0 \leq k \leq d$ such that $x = \zeta^k \pmod{p}$. Note that any integer k between 0 and d can be written as $k = an - b$ for unique integers a, b with $0 \leq a, b \leq n$, by division algorithm. Therefore, $x \in H$ if and only if there exist two integers a, b with $0 \leq a, b \leq n$ such that $x = \zeta^{an-b} \pmod{p}$, or equivalently $\zeta^b x = \zeta^{na} \pmod{p}$. Using the lemma above, we see that $x \in H$ if and only if there exist two integers a, b with $0 \leq a, b \leq n$ such that $\zeta^b x P = \zeta^{na} P$, equivalently $\zeta^b Q = (\zeta^n)^a P$ as $Q = xP$.

Now, we create a list $\{\zeta^b Q : 0 \leq b \leq n\}$. Then we generate elements of the form $(\zeta^n)^a P$ for each integer a in $[0, n]$ and try to find a collision with the earlier list. When there is a collision, i.e., $\zeta^b Q = (\zeta^n)^a P$ for some $0 \leq a, b \leq n$, it means that $x \in H$. Otherwise, $x \notin H$.

Moreover, if $x \in H$ then $\zeta^b Q = (\zeta^n)^a P$ for some $0 \leq a, b \leq n$. So, we use the integers a and b to compute $\zeta^{an-b} \pmod{p}$ which is nothing but the discrete logarithm x . Since the two lists require computation of at most $2n$ exponentiations, the worst case time complexity of the algorithm to check whether or not $x \in H$, as well as to compute x (if $x \in H$) would be $O(n) \approx O(\sqrt{d})$ steps. This completes the proof. \square

2.1 Comparing Our Work with Usual Baby-step Giant-step Algorithm

The similarity between Theorem 1 and usual baby-step giant-step is that both use division algorithm. However, the main difference between the two lies in its actual application: division algorithm is applied on the discrete logarithm x in the usual baby-step giant-step whereas the division algorithm is used on the exponent k (of the discrete logarithm x) in Theorem 1. Irrespective of the above difference, Theorem 1 works as a **generic deterministic attack** on DLP (just like baby-step giant-step) in the sense that such a subgroup \mathbb{H} always exists. For example, one can always take $\mathbb{H} = \mathbb{F}_p^\times$ as the worst-case scenario in Theorem 1, and then the (worst-case) complexity of Theorem 1 is $O(\sqrt{p-1}) = O(\sqrt{p})$, same as the usual baby-step giant-step algorithm.

2.2 Practical Implications of the Deterministic Attack of Theorem 1

The main practical advantage of the attack presented in Theorem 1 is that the cost of our attack can be far less than $O(\sqrt{p})$ if it is known to an attacker that the discrete logarithm x lies in some proper, relatively smaller subgroup \mathbb{H} of \mathbb{F}_p^\times . For example, if x lies in \mathbb{H} with $|\mathbb{H}| \approx \sqrt{p}$, then the attack in Theorem 1 solves the DLP in $O(\sqrt[4]{p})$ which is a lot faster than the best-known generic attacks on DLP.

There is another security issue that above theorem brings to the fore. We take the example of NIST curves defined over prime fields of different size viz. P-192, P-224, 256, P-384, P-521 and p denotes the respective prime order of the curves. Since the above algorithm depends on d and $p - 1$ factors into small divisors, the above theorem is applicable to each of the five NIST curves (NIST, 2000). Although, one can say that probability of randomly chosen secret x being inside a particular subgroup of \mathbb{F}_p^\times can be very small, the availability of so many divisors d of $p - 1$ of different sizes itself is not a desirable security feature from the cryptographic point of view and it is always a sound security practice to exclude any such probability, however small. Therefore, as a security necessity, it is highly **recommended** that $p - 1$ should be of the form $k \cdot p'$ for a very small value of k and some prime p' so that above algorithm does not provide any faster attack on DLP than the generic attacks.

Remark 1. *Even though the above algorithm is generic in nature, it does have a practical significance. Our algorithm applies on all the five prime order NIST curves (NIST, 2000) viz. P-192, P-224,*

P-256, P-384, P-521. Although the probability of a randomly chosen secret key x being inside a particular subgroup of \mathbb{F}_p^\times can be very small, however, it is advisable to check, using our algorithm for each curve, if the secret key x belongs to any of two (large enough) subgroups whose orders are mentioned in the appendix A. If it does, we discard the secret key.

2.3 A Probabilistic Version of Baby-step Giant-step

Suppose that $p - 1$ has large enough (but a lot smaller than $p - 1$) divisor d and H is the unique subgroup of \mathbb{F}_p^\times of order d . A drawback of the deterministic algorithm given in Theorem 1 is that it might fail to solve DLP because the probability of x belonging to H is very small. One way to increase the probability is to increase the size of d , if such d exists. Clearly, this is not a desirable solution because the computational cost depends on the size of the subgroup.

The above algorithm can be parallelized which helps us overcome this obstacle by increasing the probability. We have *randomized* the above algorithm where the random inputs will be running on parallel processes or threads. This parallelization along with collision algorithm (based on birthday paradox) (Hoffstein et al., 2008, Theorem 5.38) yields a randomized probabilistic algorithm which can solve DLP with a given probability.

Collision Theorem: An urn contains N balls, of which n balls are red and $N - n$ are blue. One randomly selects a ball from the urn, replaces it in the urn, randomly selects a second ball, replaces it, and so on. He does this until he has looked at a total number of m balls. Then, the probability that he selects at least one red ball is

$$\Pr(\text{at least one red ball}) = 1 - \left(1 - \frac{n}{N}\right)^m \geq 1 - e^{-\frac{nm}{N}}.$$

Theorem 2. Let G be an additive cyclic group generated by P and the order of P is a prime p . Let $Q = xP$ be another given element of G (x is unknown). For a given divisor d of $p - 1$, let H be the unique subgroup of \mathbb{F}_p^\times of order d . Then, x can be computed in $O(\sqrt{d})$

steps with probability at least $1 - e^{-\frac{dm}{p-1}}$ if one has access to m parallel threads.

Proof. The main idea is to run the algorithm in Theorem 1 on each of m threads as follows. We randomly selects m elements y_1, y_2, \dots, y_m in \mathbb{F}_p^\times and compute corresponding m elements $Q_1 = y_1Q = (y_1x)P, \dots, Q_m = y_mQ = (y_mx)P$ of G . Now, we run the above algorithm on each of m parallel threads, with element $Q_i = (y_ix)P$ running on i^{th} thread. Let

$z_i = y_ix \pmod{p}$ for $i = 1, \dots, m$. If $z_i \in H$ for some i , $1 \leq i \leq m$; then the algorithm on that thread returns z_i . Once we have z_i for some i , we compute $z_i \cdot y_i^{-1} \pmod{p}$ which is nothing but the discrete logarithm x .

The collision theorem above tells us about the probability of at least one z_i belonging to H for $1 \leq i \leq m$. In present case, \mathbb{F}_p^\times with $p - 1$ elements is the urn, so $N = p - 1$. The elements of H are red balls, so $n = d$. Since we are randomly selecting m elements y_1, \dots, y_m from \mathbb{F}_p^\times , it implies that z_1, z_2, \dots, z_m also are random elements of \mathbb{F}_p^\times . Therefore, probability that at least one of z_i would belong to H is at least $1 - e^{-\frac{dm}{p-1}}$, by the collision theorem. In other words, with probability at least $1 - e^{-\frac{dm}{p-1}}$, one can compute z_i for some i , $1 \leq i \leq m$ if one has access to m threads. Since the number of steps performed on each thread before z_i is computed for some i is at max $2\sqrt{d}$, we conclude that it takes $O(\sqrt{d})$ steps to compute x with the probability at least $1 - e^{-\frac{dm}{p-1}}$ if m threads are available. This completes the proof. \square

Remark 2. It follows from Theorem 2 that if there exist divisors d of $p - 1$ of suitable sizes, then DLP can be solved in time much less than the square root of the group size but with a probability which increases with the number of threads used. A practical importance of Theorem 2 lies in the fact that such divisors of $p - 1$ do exist for all NIST curves (NIST, 2000) as well as most of SEC2 curves (SEC 2 (Version 2), 2010). This gives us precise estimates about the number of group operations and threads needed to solve DLP with a given probability. We illustrate this by an example in the next section.

Remark 3. Note that the probability of solving the DLP in above theorem is proportional to the product $m \cdot d$. It follows that if we fix a probability, this product is constant. Therefore, for a fixed probability of solving the DLP, there is a trade-off between the number of steps and number of threads needed in Theorem 2. Increasing one of the two would decrease the other and vice-versa.

3 SECURITY ANALYSIS OF NIST CURVE P-256

As discussed earlier, our probabilistic algorithm is applicable to NIST curves. In this section, we will demonstrate the implication of our algorithm on NIST curves. We will do that only on the NIST curve P-256 but similar conclusions hold for other four

Table 1: Trade-off between d and m for equal probability for curve P-256.

	$\log_2 d_1 = 201.73$ $\log_2(\sqrt{d_1}) = 101.86$	$\log_2 d_2 = 202.73$ $\log_2(\sqrt{d_2}) = 101.36$	$\log_2 d_3 = 203.32$ $\log_2(\sqrt{d_3}) = 101.66$
$\log_2 m = 45$	0.00162	0.00324	0.00486
$\log_2 m = 50$	0.05064	0.098711	0.14435
$\log_2 m = 52$	0.18768	0.34013	0.46398
$\log_2 m = 53$	0.34013	0.56458	0.71268
$\log_2 m = 54$	0.56458	0.81040	0.91745
$\log_2 m = 55$	0.81040	0.96405	0.993184
$\log_2 m = 56$	0.96405	0.99871	0.99995

NIST curves over prime field as well, see appendix. The NIST curve P-256 is defined over the prime field \mathbb{F}_q and the order of P-256 is a prime p given below.

$q = 11579208921035624876269744694940757353$
 $0086143415290314195533631308867097853951$
 $p = 11579208921035624876269744694940757352$
 $9996955224135760342422259061068512044369$
 $p - 1 = 2^4 \cdot 3 \cdot 71 \cdot 131 \cdot 373 \cdot 3407 \cdot 17449 \cdot 38189 \cdot$
 $187019741 \cdot 622491383 \cdot 1002328039319 \cdot$
 $2624747550333869278416773953$

Since $p - 1$ factors into many relatively small integers, we have the following divisors of $p - 1$ of various sizes.

$d_1 = 5344274495032941459639941436409709731$
 $020474123788264129719829 \approx 2^{201.73}$.

$d_2 = 1068854899006588291927988287281941946$
 $2040948247576528259439658 \approx 2^{202.73}$.

$d_3 = 1603282348509882437891982430922912919$
 $3061422371364792389159487 \approx 2^{203.32}$.

$d_4 = 1820794320457723155299328047384788105$
 $3586755339746615889955457403 \approx 2^{213.47}$.

$d_5 = 2385240559799617333442119742074072418$
 $019864949506806681584164919793 \approx 2^{220.50}$.

For above sizes of subgroups and various number of threads m , the following tables give the probability to solve DLP. The second column of the Table 1 shows the probabilities when the subgroup size is $d_1 \approx 2^{201.73}$ bits. For example, if we have $m = 2^{54}$ parallel threads, then our algorithm would solve DLP in $2^{101.86}$ steps with probability 0.56458 which is the intersection of the fifth row (corresponding to $m = 2^{54}$) and the second column (corresponding to $d_1 \approx 2^{201.73}$). Other entries (probabilities) of the tables can be understood similarly.

Table 2: Probability for larger d for P-256

	$\log_2 d_4 = 213.47$ $\log_2(\sqrt{d_4}) = 106.78$
$\log_2 m = 41$	0.29234
$\log_2 m = 42$	0.49921
$\log_2 m = 43$	0.74921
$\log_2 m = 44$	0.93710

If we go across a row in the tables, we see the probabilities getting increased with the size of subgroup d . If we move along a column, probabilities increase with the number (m) of parallel threads. Table 1 also exhibits the trade-off between d and m for equal probability. For equal probability, highlighted diagonally in the second and third column, we see that increasing the subgroup size by 1-bit (d_1 and d_2 differ by 1-bit) results in a decrease of 1-bit in the number of parallel threads m . As an example, to achieve the probability 0.56458, the subgroup of order d_1 requires 2^{54} parallel threads while the subgroup of order d_2 requires 2^{53} .

Table 3: Probability for much larger d for P-256

	$\log_2 d_5 = 220.50$ $\log_2(\sqrt{d_5}) = 110.25$
$\log_2 m = 33$	0.16218
$\log_2 m = 34$	0.29805
$\log_2 m = 35$	0.50727
$\log_2 m = 36$	0.75721
$\log_2 m = 37$	0.94106

From Table 3, we can see that DLP on the curve P-256 can be solved in $2^{110.25}$ (with a significant reduction from 2^{128}) steps with probability greater than 0.5, while using 2^{35} parallel threads. This indicates a weakness of NIST curve P-256 if one assumes that 2^{35} parallel threads are within the reach of modern distributed computing. Similar conclusions can be drawn for other NIST curves P-192, P-224, P-384 and P-521 see appendix.

Moreover, one observes that for most of the curves in SEC2 (Version 2) (SEC 2 (Version 2), 2010) which

also include all other ten NIST curves (NIST, 2000) over binary field, $p - 1$ factors into small divisors. Therefore, our algorithm for solving DLP on those curves in SEC2 (SEC 2 (Version 2), 2010) can similarly be studied.

4 CONCLUSION

In this paper we presented a novel idea of using the implicit representation with \mathbb{F}_p^\times as an auxiliary group to solve the discrete logarithm problem in a group \mathbb{G} of prime order p . We modified the most common generic algorithm, the baby-step giant-step algorithm to give another deterministic attack on DLP. The practical significance of our deterministic attack is that it can be a lot faster than baby-step giant-step in certain cases. The choice of parameter selection is also suggested to prevent our faster deterministic attack. Moreover, we have also presented a probabilistic version of baby-step giant-step algorithm and studied it further for NIST curves over prime fields. This algorithm that we developed brings to the spotlight the structure of the auxiliary group for the security of the discrete logarithm problem in G . This aspect is probably reported for the first time.

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APPENDIX

NIST Curves Over Prime Field

For each of these five NIST curves of order prime p , two subgroups of \mathbb{F}_p^\times with (large enough) orders d_1, d_2 are given such that $d_1 \cdot d_2 = p - 1$ and $\gcd(d_1, d_2) = 1$, see Remark 1.

P-192

$$p = 6277101735386680763835789423176059013767194773182842284081$$

$$p - 1 = 2^4 \cdot 5 \cdot 2389 \cdot 9564682313913860059195669 \cdot 3433859179316188682119986911$$

$$d_1 = 656279166350909980926771898430320 \approx 2^{109.02}$$

$$d_2 = 9564682313913860059195669 \approx 2^{82.98}$$

P-224

$$p = 26959946667150639794667015087019625940457807714424391721682722368061$$

$$p - 1 = 2^2 \cdot 3^6 \cdot 5 \cdot 2153 \cdot 50520606258875818707470860153287666700917696099933389351507$$

$$d_1 = 50520606258875818707470860153287666700917696099933389351507 \approx 2^{195.01}$$

$$d_2 = 533642580 \approx 2^{28.99}$$

P-256

$$p = 115792089210356248762697446949407573529996955224135760342422259061068512044369$$

$$p - 1 = 2^4 \cdot 3 \cdot 71 \cdot 131 \cdot 373 \cdot 3407 \cdot 17449 \cdot 38189 \cdot 187019741 \cdot 622491383 \cdot 1002328039319 \cdot 2624747550333869278416773953$$

$$d_1 = 1489153224408067225170753316415649493584 \approx 2^{130.13}$$

$$d_2 = 77757001302792844776776389119582520177 \approx 2^{125.87}$$

P-384

$$p = 39402006196394479212279040100143613805079739270465446667946905279627659$$

3991132635693989563081522949135544336
53942643
 $p - 1 = 2 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 7^2 \cdot 13 \cdot$
1124679999981664229965379347
3055465788140352002733946906144561090
6412496061604078843653919797049292684
80326390471
 $d_1 = 116779902422724253544491450752845$
1248843085599474507893404452814643223
9664131807464380162 $\approx 2^{292.55}$
 $d_2 = 1124679999981664229965379347$
 $\approx 2^{89.86}$

P-521

$p = 686479766013060971498190079908139$
321726943530014330540939446345918554
318339765539424505774633321719753296
39963713633211138647686124403803403
72808892707005449
 $p - 1 = 2^3 \cdot 7 \cdot 11 \cdot 1283 \cdot 1458105463$
 $\cdot 1647781915921980690468599 \cdot$
361519479488193001021694255910384759
305026570317329238370137171235087892
682166124375593383542689605841850975
9880171943
 $d_1 = 4166083869350854498586791068944823$
62094293135755259682030509895497369427
12923152533496543294196006831576365431
08630210814256821981752 $\approx 2^{440.55}$
 $d_2 = 1647781915921980690468599 \approx 2^{80.45}$

